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Hedge fund vs. non-hedge fund institutional demand and the book-to-market effect
Mustafa Onur Caglayana, Umut Celikerb,*, Gokhan Sonaerc
1. Introduction
The book-to-market effect, the average return difference be- 
tween high book-to-market and low book-to-market ratio securi- 
ties, has been one of the oldest and most widely investigated top- 
ics in the asset pricing literature. Although Fama and French (1992, 
1993, 1995, 1996) provide risk-based justifications, a large part of 
the following literature attributes this phenomenon to the naive 
investors’ overreaction. Daniel et al. (1998), and Barberis et al. 
(1998) show investors’ overconfidence, biased self-attribution and 
the tendency of investors to view events as representative to be 
the source of this overreaction. Similarly, La Porta et al. (1997) and 
more recently Brav et al. (2005) find significant evidence of expec- 
tations error, supporting the view of overreaction as the basis for 
the book-to-market premium.1
While naive investors’ overreaction could contribute to the 
book-to-market effect, one can claim that sophisticated investors,
namely, institutions, should exploit this return predictability, take 
advantage of the anomaly, and therefore mitigate the extent of 
overreaction. However, contrary to expectations, recent studies 
provide striking evidence that institutional investors actually ex­
acerbate this price overreaction, thereby contributing to the book- 
to-market effect. In other words, institutions do not act in a so- 
phisticated manner and do not take into account the information 
that high book-to-market (value) stocks outperform low book-to- 
market (growth) stocks. Jiang (2010) shows empirical evidence that 
institutions tend to trade in the direction of intangible returns.2 In 
other words, institutions buy shares in response to positive intan- 
gible information and sell shares in response to negative intangible 
information, causing excessive pricing (overreaction) of such infor- 
mation, thereby contributing to the formation of book-to-anomaly, 
which is driven by the subsequent correction of overreaction to 
past high intangible returns. Jiang (2010) also reveals that the value 
effect increases with the intensity of institutional trading, partic- 
ularly due to the poor subsequent performance of growth stocks 
that have been subject to intense uninformed institutional buying.
In a recent study, Edelen et al. (2016) provide similar evidence 
that institutions not only fail to change their portfolios to take 
advantage of the book-to-market effect, but they do the oppo- 
site and buy significantly more of the overvalued low book-to- 
market (growth) stocks compared to undervalued high book-to- 
market (value) stocks over time. More importantly, Edelen et al. 
(2016) reveal a negative and significant relation between changes 
in institutional holdings and future stock returns when both the 
standard book-to-market anomaly portfolio formation period and 
the anomaly return measurement period span a year or longer. It 
is critical to emphasize that the underperformance of portfolios 
based on institutional trading with respect to book-to-market is 
driven primarily by the poor performance of growth stocks that 
are heavily bought by institutions.
In this paper, we examine whether a prominent sub-group of 
institutional investors, hedge funds, act differently than the other 
institutional investors and adjust their positions to take advantage 
of the book-to-market effect prior to the standard return measure- 
ment window of book-to-market portfolios. Our particular focus is 
on hedge funds; because both trading wise and structurally they 
differ from other institutional investors, such as mutual funds, pen- 
sion funds, endowments, etc. in many ways. First, hedge funds 
have a much shorter horizon with their investments than other 
institutional investors. Compared to other institutional investors, 
hedge funds can get in and out of positions much easier and faster. 
This is evident in our data in the twice as high turnover statis- 
tics reported for hedge funds compared to other institutional in- 
vestors. Second, hedge funds are not heavily regulated by govern- 
ment agencies and therefore they have much more flexibility in 
their investment strategies (including the use of short-sell, lever- 
age and derivatives) and they do not face any concentration is- 
sues as do other institutions. Thus, when an opportunity comes up, 
hedge funds can either load on a particular stock heavily or short 
the stock as much as short-selling constraints allow, and in turn 
they can exhaust the mispricing to a great extent.3 In other words, 
hedge funds are in a better position to detect mispriced securities 
and trade them to their advantage compared to other institutional 
investors.4
We measure hedge fund and non-hedge fund demand (with 
respect to book-to-market effect) during the six-quarter window 
prior to return measurement of anomaly returns by utilizing the 
institutional demand measure of Edelen et al. (2016), which is 
based on the change in the number of institutions holding a stock 
in a given quarter. This measure, which primarily focuses on re- 
cently closed and opened positions in a stock, has a better abil- 
ity to detect trades based on information, compared to changes in 
shares held in a stock by institutional investors, which may reflect 
trades based on operational needs such as fund flows and portfolio 
rebalancing.5
Our results show that hedge funds indeed change their trading 
behavior with respect to low book-to-market (growth) and high 
book-to-market (value) stocks during April-June period (quarter 
q), after book-to-market values become public information during
January-March period (quarter q-1) of year t.6 While the differ- 
ence in the hedge fund demand between value and growth stocks 
during the prior five quarters from q-5 to q-1 (from January of 
year t-1 to March of year t) is significantly negative, it becomes 
significantly positive in quarter q (April-June period of year t).7 
Interestingly, we also document that non-hedge funds alter their 
trading preferences with respect to growth and value stocks in 
quarter q compared to the previous five quarters, but not to the 
same degree as hedge funds do.8 We perceive this change in their 
trading direction in quarter q as a signal that hedge funds start to 
pay attention to the value premium after the book-to-market val- 
ues for the entire cross-section of stocks become available to sort 
firms into book-to-market portfolios.
The finding that hedge funds change their trading preferences 
with respect to growth and value stocks in quarter q does not nec- 
essarily imply that they have superior ability to detect mispriced 
securities among growth and value stocks compared to other insti- 
tutional investors. For a more direct test, we focus on the disagree- 
ment between hedge funds’ and non-hedge funds’ trading in quar- 
ter q with respect to book-to-market effect, and examine whether 
such disagreement predicts the future stock returns. Our focus on 
disagreement is motivated by the fact that future abnormal re- 
turns of a stock that hedge funds buy (sell) cannot be attributed to 
hedge funds’ superior stock picking ability if other types of insti- 
tutions buy (sell) the same stock contemporaneously. To this end, 
we conduct independently sorted trivariate portfolio tests based on 
the book-to-market ratio as well as the trading direction of hedge 
funds and non-hedge funds simultaneously.
We find that hedge funds have better ability to detect mispriced 
growth stocks compared to non-hedge funds.9 In particular, growth 
stocks heavily bought by non-hedge funds and simultaneously sold 
by hedge funds in the most recent quarter q (the April-June pe- 
riod), underperform significantly in the next year, generating sta- 
tistically significant three- and four- factor alphas of —1.21% and 
-1.02% per month, respectively. Moreover, this result cannot be at- 
tributed to any price pressure, as the change in aggregate number 
of institutions as well as the change in the percentage of shares 
held by institutions for these aforementioned growth stocks are 
positive in quarter q. On the other hand, we do not find any sig- 
nificant negative subsequent abnormal returns for growth stocks 
heavily bought by hedge funds and simultaneously sold by non- 
hedge funds, indicating no evidence of an ability to detect over- 
priced growth stocks for non-hedge funds.
Looking at high book-to-market (value) stocks, we find some- 
what weaker evidence of hedge funds detecting underpriced se- 
curities. That is, high book-to-market stocks heavily sold by non- 
hedge funds and simultaneously bought by hedge funds do not 
generate as statistically significant risk-adjusted returns (in abso-
lute terms) in the following year as those observed in growth 
stocks. One plausible explanation for this difference in the results 
for overpriced vs. underpriced securities could be the asymmetry 
in arbitrage. The arbitrage of overpricing may take a long time due 
to short-selling constraints, whereas the arbitrage of underpricing 
is likely to be much easier as it only requires buying those under­
priced securities. Due to this asymmetry in arbitrage, underpricing 
dissipates much faster than overpricing.10
In an effort to see what hedge funds capture in overpriced 
growth stocks, we examine and compare the characteristics of 
these stocks sold by- to the ones bought by hedge funds within 
the growth stocks heavily bought by non-hedge funds. Although 
there are some minor differences in the characteristics, including 
book-to-market ratios, size, price, demand, idiosyncratic volatility, 
illiquidity, intangible returns, and standardized earnings surprises 
across the two groups, controlling for these stock characteristics 
in multivariate Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions does not elimi- 
nate the predictive power of hedge fund trading (demand) on the 
cross-sectional variation in future stock returns. This suggests that 
hedge funds are able to detect negative information about over- 
priced growth stocks better than other institutions, but this infor- 
mation is not confined to any specific stock characteristic that we 
consider.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a brief liter- 
ature review. Section 3 provides information on data and variables 
and offers some summary statistics on hedge fund and non-hedge 
fund trading. Section 4 examines the change in trading preferences 
of hedge funds and non- hedge funds with respect to book-to- 
market effect before and after book-to-market values become pub- 
lic information. Section 5 presents the return predictability tests 
conditional on the book-to-market ratio and the disagreement be- 
tween hedge funds’ and non-hedge funds’ trades. Section 6 pro- 
vides results from some robustness tests. Section 7 concludes the 
paper.
2. Literature review
The previous literature on institutional investors and their re- 
action to book-to-market effect reveals that institutions as a whole 
group tend to trade in the direction that exacerbates the value pre- 
mium. Among the earlier studies, Frazzini and Lamont (2008) show 
that money tends to flow out of value-oriented mutual funds and 
into growth-oriented funds, inducing fund managers to sell value 
stocks and purchase growth stocks. They argue that value effect 
might be due to investor capital flowing into funds holding growth 
stocks. In a more specific context, examining the impact of insti- 
tutional trading on book-to-market effect, Jiang (2010) reveals that 
the value effect increases with the intensity of institutional trading. 
More recently, Edelen et al. (2016) find evidence that institutions 
do not exploit the anomaly-predicted returns; and in fact, show 
that institutions buy growth stocks significantly more compared to 
value stocks, and those growth stocks heavily bought by institu- 
tions underperform in the subsequent periods. Different from the 
studies above, in this paper we focus on a sub-group of institu-
tional investors, mainly hedge funds, and examine whether they 
trade differently from other institutions with respect to book-to- 
market effect.
The explosive growth of hedge fund industry over the last two 
decades has yielded several studies on hedge funds’ role in stock 
market efficiency. The findings from the previous literature provide 
good reasons to believe that hedge funds may act differently from 
non-hedge funds in the context of book-to-market effect. Among 
the ones closely related to our study, Akbas et al. (2015) show that 
flows to hedge funds reduce aggregate mispricing while aggregate 
flows to mutual funds exacerbate mispricing. In another recent 
study, Jiao and Ye (2014) examine the interaction between hedge 
fund and mutual fund herding, and find that mutual fund herd- 
ing follows hedge fund herding, leading to a sharp price reversal 
in the following quarter; whereas hedge fund herding itself does 
not destabilize prices. Moreover, Cao et al. (2017) find evidence 
that hedge funds hold undervalued securities with large positive 
alphas, and show that hedge funds’ holdings and trades are in- 
formative about the future stock returns. Similarly, Kokkonen and 
Suominen (2015) provide evidence that hedge funds’ trades help 
reduce the undervaluation. In an earlier study, Brunnermeir and 
Nagel (2004), using holdings information of 53 hedge funds, show 
that hedge funds were able to trade in the right direction to a 
great extent both during formation and burst of the tech bubble.11 
In this study, by using 13F filings of hedge funds, we analyze the 
response of hedge funds to the book-to-market effect. Our study 
contributes to the literature by showing that hedge funds’ trade 
direction changes after book-to-market values become public in- 
formation.
Our study is also related to previous literature on hedge funds 
that analyzes the risk and peculiar characteristics of hedge funds 
that help them generate higher risk-adjusted returns compared 
to non-hedge funds. Joenvaara and Kahra (2017) provide a com- 
prehensive summary on return-based and fund characteristics- 
based predictors for future hedge fund performance. Titman and 
Tiu (2011) find that hedge funds with low R-squares on factors 
have higher Sharpe ratios. Sun et al. (2012) propose a measure of 
the distinctiveness of a fund’s investment strategy (SDI) and find 
that higher SDl is associated with better subsequent performance. 
Bollen and Whaley (2009) and Patton and Ramadorai (2013) both 
document that hedge fund risk exposures are time-varying.12 In 
line with these studies, we find that hedge funds’ exposure to high 
and low book-to-market stocks are time-varying as well. More- 
over, we show that the growth stocks that are heavily bought by 
non-hedge funds and simultaneously sold by hedge funds expe- 
rience significant losses in the following year, providing evidence 
that hedge funds have better ability to detect mispricing within 
the context of book-to-market anomaly.13
3. Data, variable definitions, and summary statistics
In this section, we describe the data and the construction of 
variables as well as provide a basic comparison between hedge 
funds and other institutions in regards to their trading behavior.
3.1. Sample and data
We obtain the data on stock prices and returns from the Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Monthly Stock File. The ac- 
counting data are from CRSP/Compustat Merged Database. We in- 
clude only US common stocks (CRSP share code of 10 or 11) traded 
on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. We exclude stocks with negative 
book equity values. We eliminate stocks with share prices less than 
$5 at the end of every June to alleviate the bid-ask bounce effect.
We define the book-to-market ratio of a firm in June of year 
t by dividing the total book value of equity at the fiscal year end 
of a firm in year t-1 with total market value of equity at the end 
of calendar year t-1. The total book value of equity is measured 
by subtracting preferred stock value from the shareholder’s equity. 
We use stockholder’s equity (SEQ) to measure shareholder’s equity. 
If stockholder’s equity is missing, we use the sum of total common 
equity (CEQ) and preferred stock par value (PSTK). If shareholder’s 
equity is still missing, we subtract total liabilities from total assets 
to measure the shareholder’s equity. If any of these three ways do 
not yield any shareholder’s equity measure, we treat it as missing 
for that firm in that year. For preferred stock value, we use re- 
demption value (PSTKRV), liquidating value (PSTKL) and par value 
(PSTK) depending on availability in that order. If all three preferred 
stock values are missing, we treat book value of equity as missing. 
Finally, we add the balance sheet deferred taxes and investment 
credit (TXDITC) to the book value of equity, if they are not miss- 
ing.
We obtain quarterly data on institutional holdings from the 
CDA/Spectrum database maintained by Thomson-Reuters. Institu- 
tions with greater than $100 million under discretionary manage- 
ment are required to report their equity holdings to SEC if they 
have more than either 10,000 shares or $200,000 in market value. 
We match hedge fund names obtained from Lipper Trading Advi- 
sor Selection System (TASS) database with the institution names 
in 13F filings to generate the hedge fund holdings data.14’15 The 
holdings information in 13F is filed at the advisory firm (manager) 
level rather than at the individual hedge fund level, and an advisor 
can advise multiple funds. We believe that the advisory firm level 
position openings and closings can better reflect the manager’s in- 
formation. Therefore, the advisory firm level data is appropriate for 
this study as we are interested in trading behavior of hedge fund 
managers with respect to the book-to-market effect.16
The institutional holdings data in Thomson-Reuters starts in De­
cember 1980 and we measure the institutional demand for the first 
time in the calendar quarter that ends in June of 1982. The full pe­
riod of our return tests span 384 months from July of 1982 to June 
of 2014.
3.2. Summary statistics of hedge fund vs. non-hedge fund trading
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of institutional trading for 
hedge funds and non-hedge funds separately, where reported 
statistics are computed as the time-series averages of the cross- 
sectional means and medians. The average number of hedge funds 
in our quarterly analysis is 196, corresponding to 12.06% of the 
total number of institutional investors in our sample. This fig- 
ure ranges from 44 in early years to 382 during the more re- 
cent period. Meanwhile, the average number of stocks in a hedge 
fund (non-hedge) portfolio is 314 (237). Following Carhart (1997), 
we compute the turnover of each institution by scaling the quar- 
terly purchases or sales, whichever is smaller, to total assets. This 
methodology, using the minimum of sales or purchases, is able to 
detect fund trading mostly unrelated to the fund inflows or out- 
flows. We find that turnover measures of hedge funds are on av- 
erage 50% larger than that of other institutions. Additionally, we 
aggregate each fund’s purchases and sales across stocks in a given 
quarter. For both buys and sells, we find that hedge funds’ trades 
are almost twice as large in volume as those of other institutions. 
These are consistent with Griffin and Xu (2009) who find similar 
differences for hedge funds in terms of number of stocks, turnover, 
and size of long equity positions. Altogether, these patterns indi- 
cate that hedge funds’ trades constitute an important portion of 
the stock market.
4. Hedge fund vs. non-hedge fund demand based on
book-to-market
In this section, we explore how institutional investors, with a 
special focus on hedge funds, modify their portfolios over time 
with respect to the anomalous pattern in stock returns associated 
with the book-to-market ratio.
Jiang (2010) tracks changes in total institutional ownership dur- 
ing a four-quarter period from July of year t-1 to June of year 
t. Similarly, Edelen et al. (2016) analyze changes in institutional 
ownership during a six-quarter period from January of year t-1 
to June of year t. These periods encompass the realization of book- 
to-market values over the year t-1, the announcement of book-to- 
market values during the period from January to March of year t, 
and the three months following the full public disclosure of book- 
to-market values (the period from April to June of year t). Both 
Jiang (2010) and Edelen et al. (2016) analyze the implications of 
institutional demand for stock returns by measuring portfolio re- 
turns in the following year from the beginning of July of year t to 
the end of June of year t+ 1 (i.e., the return measurement window 
of the anomaly returns).
Jiang (2010), Dasgupta et al. (2011), and Edelen et al. (2016) and 
papers on herding measures such as Wermers (1999) use the 
change in number of institutions to create measures of trading 
intensity.17 Similarly, we use the change in the number of insti­
tutions (A#inst) to measure the institutional demand for a stock 
in a given quarter.18 Following Chen, Hong and Stein (2002) and
Table 1Descriptive statistics of institutional trading: Hedge funds vs. Non-hedge fundsThis table presents the summary statistics of the sample partitioned into two groups, namely, hedge funds and other institutions excluding hedge funds. Hedge funds in Thomson Reuter’s 13f filings are determined by matching the names of hedge funds from the Lipper TASS dataset. Institutional holdings are derived using quarterly equity holdings reports (13f) from CDA/Spectrum database of Thomson Financials. The mean number of institutions, mean and median of number of stocks, turnover, buys (in millions), sales (in millions), and next quarter return calculated based on trades in the prior quarter are reported for both hedge funds and other institutions, separately. Following Carhart (1997), turnover is calculated as the ratio of the minimum of the total sales and total buys to the average of the current and previous quarter's total assets. The sample period is 1982 to 2013.
period Type No of Institutions
No of stocks in portfolio TurnoverMin( Buys,Sales)/Assets Buys (in millions) Sales (in millions) Next Quarter Return based on tradesMean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
1982-1985 Non Hedge Fund 567 189 121 9.39% 7.11% 98.03 34.88 92.06 32.25 0.28% 0.41%Hedge Fund 44 259 158 12.59% 10.85% 203.26 90.98 183.04 73.94 0.86% 1.05%1986-1989 Non Hedge Fund 759 220 122 10.73% 7.97% 131.96 40.75 130.61 41.49 0.20% 0.28%Hedge Fund 69 290 173 13.92% 12.52% 284.72 134.43 287.65 129.27 0.53% 0.69%1990-1993 Non Hedge Fund 899 235 114 9.42% 6.75% 147.99 35.89 131.23 34.47 0.14% 0.14%Hedge Fund 95 288 150 14.17% 11.95% 290.03 121.72 258.36 119.98 0.38% 0.50%1994-1997 Non Hedge Fund 1082 264 113 10.62% 7.69% 258.74 44.37 230.71 42.05 0.20% 0.22%Hedge Fund 130 359 148 17.51% 14.32% 537.14 175.56 477.39 151.97 0.48% 0.38%1998-2001 Non Hedge Fund 1427 269 110 11.50% 7.76% 493.03 58.47 444.44 55.68 0.76% 0.43%Hedge Fund 212 376 121 20.98% 17.15% 975.14 203.43 874.83 191.61 0.93% 0.85%2002-2005 Non Hedge Fund 1733 256 95 11.67% 6.96% 333.13 39.78 301.51 37.76 0.22% 0.22%Hedge Fund 284 336 105 22.59% 18.33% 654.95 163.99 600.91 138.72 0.57% 0.54%2006-2009 Non Hedge Fund 2321 238 86 13.03% 8.15% 398.07 45.71 372.64 44.16 0.39% 0.36%Hedge Fund 382 313 85 23.64% 19.84% 814.62 163.38 759.82 153.13 0.29% 0.35%2010-2013 Non Hedge Fund 2647 222 79 12.29% 7.35% 316.36 38.70 311.70 39.09 -0.03% -0.04%Hedge Fund 351 293 80 21.23% 16.85% 689.96 144.70 671.66 143.08 -0.01% -0.01%1982-2013 Non Hedge Fund 1429 237 105 11.08% 7.47% 272.16 42.32 251.86 40.87 0.27% 0.25%Hedge Fund 196 314 127 18.33% 15.22% 556.23 149.77 514.21 137.71 0.50% 0.54%
Edelen et al. (2016), we also scale the change in the number of in- 
stitutional investors in a given quarter by the average number of 
the same group institutional investors holding stocks in the same 
market capitalization decile based on NYSE breakpoints.19 In our 
study, we focus on hedge fund vs. non-hedge fund demand partic- 
ularly in quarter q (April-June period of year t) after the book-to- 
market values become public information in quarter q-1, and an- 
alyze the implications of hedge fund and non-hedge fund demand 
on stock returns by looking at the next year portfolio returns in 
the same way as Jiang (2010) and Edelen et al. (2016). In Fig. 1, 
we provide a detailed picture of the timeline for measuring insti- 
tutional demand and the following return measurement windw for 
our study as well as Jiang (2010) and Edelen et al. (2016).
In Table 2, we present evidence on how institutional de- 
mand varies over time and across stocks with different book-to- 
market ratios while paying particular attention to hedge funds. 
Over the six quarters from January of year t-1 to June of year t 
(i.e., from quarter q-5 to quarter q in Table 2), institutional de- 
mand is greater for growth stocks than value stocks, consistent 
with Jiang (2010) and Edelen et al. (2016). We find that both 
hedge funds and non-hedge funds act similarly and invest more in 
growth stocks compared to value stocks during the same period.
Then, we divide the aforementioned six-quarter period into two 
sub-periods, and examine the institutional demand for the first 
five quarters (i.e., from quarter q-5 to quarter q-1), and for the 
last quarter q, just prior to the return measurement window, sepa- 
rately. We find for both hedge funds and non-hedge funds that the 
difference in average quarterly demand between value and growth 
stocks is negative and highly significant (in favor of growth stocks)
in the first five quarters from quarter q-5 to q-1. Interestingly, we 
also notice for both hedge funds and non-hedge funds during the 
same time period that the difference in average quarterly demand 
between growth and neutral (quintile 3) stocks is significantly pos­
itive, while the difference in average quarterly demand between 
value and neutral stocks is significantly negative. In other words, 
both hedge fund and non-hedge fund demand decrease monoton­
ically as we move from growth to value stocks during the period 
from q-5 to q-1.
In quarter q, however, hedge funds change their trading pref- 
erences drastically with respect to growth and value stocks. In this 
quarter, the difference in average quarterly hedge fund demand be- 
tween value and growth stocks becomes positive and significant 
in favor of value stocks at 3.89% with a t-statistic of 3.63. Simi- 
larly, the difference in average quarterly hedge fund demand be- 
tween growth and neutral stocks also changes signs and becomes 
significantly negative in quarter q, while the difference in average 
quarterly hedge fund demand between value and neutral stocks 
changes signs and becomes significantly positive.29 That is, hedge 
fund demand this time increases monotonically as we move from 
growth to value stocks in quarter q. On the other hand, for non- 
hedge funds, in quarter q, although the difference in average quar- 
terly demand between value and growth firms gets much smaller 
in magnitude, it remains still negative at -0.84% and statistically 
significant at the 5% level in favor of growth stocks.
In panel A of Fig. 2, we plot the difference in average quarterly 
demand between value and growth stocks in each of the six quar- 
ters, q-5 to q for hedge funds and non-hedge funds separately. 
This difference is negative in all of the first five quarters from 
q-5 to q-1 for both hedge funds and non-hedge funds, indicat- 
ing a higher demand for growth stocks compared to value stocks. 
In quarter q, however, the demand difference flips sign only for
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Fig. 1. Timeline for the construction of portfolios based on the book-to-market and institutional tradingPortfolios are constructed at the end of June of year t based on book-to-market ratios as of fiscal year end in year t-1. In Jiang (2010), the institutional demand is measured over four calendar quarters from the end of June of year t-1 to the end of June of year t. In Edelen et al. (2016), institutional demand is measured over six calendar quarters from the end of December of year t-2 to the end of June of year t. In this study, institutional demand is measured separately for quarter q, the most recent quarter prior to the return measurement window, covering April, May, and June of year t. The portfolio holding period returns are measured over 12 months from the end of June of year t to the end of June of year t+1.
Table 2Institutional demand over time for book-to-market quintilesAt the end of June of year t, five quintile portfolios are formed on the basis of book-to-market ratios measured based on the information at the end of December of year t-1. This table reports the average hedge fund demand, non-hedge fund demand, and total institutional demand for each book-to-market quintile for the quarter(s) 
q-5 to q, q-5 to q-1, and q, where q is the quarter from the beginning of April of year t to the end of June of year t. The difference in demand between high and low book-to-market quintiles, high and neutral book-to-market quintiles, low and neutral book-to-market quintiles are also presented. Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Hedge fund (Non-hedge fund) demand for each stock is measured as the change in the number of hedge funds (non-hedge funds) holding the stock from the prior quarter scaled by the average number of hedge funds (non-hedge funds) holding stocks within the same market capitalization decile as of the March of year t. Similarly, institutional demand for each stock is measured as the change in the number of institutions holding the stock from the prior quarter scaled by the average number of institutions holding stocks within the same market capitalization decile as of the March of year t. All variables are winsorized at 1% level. The sample period is from June 1982 to June 2013. The numbers in bold denote significance at the 1% level.Hedge fund demand Non-hedge fund demand Total institutional Demand[q-5, q] [q-5, q-1] q (April - June)] [q-5, q] [q-5, q-1] q (April - June)] [q-5, q] [q-5, q-1] q (April-June)]Growth (low B/M) 9.22% 9.97% 4.40% 8.30% 8.66% 4.92% 8.42% 8.86% 4.82%2 6.63% 6.73% 4,77% 6.23% 6.35% 4.45% 6.27% 6.40% 4.50%3 (Neutral) 5.50% 4.94% 6.15% 4.41% 4.28% 4.08% 4.55% 4.38% 4.41%4 4.76% 4.13% 6.39% 3.25% 2.96% 3.85% 3.48% 3.14% 4.22%Value (high B/M) 3.78% 2.40% 8.28% 1.84% 1.21% 4.08% 2.14% 1.41% 4.69%Value - Growth -5.45% -7.58% 3.89% -6.46% -7.45% -0.84% -6.28% -7.45% -0.13%t-statistic (-6.58) (-6.23) (3.63) (-7.74) (-7.70) (-2.08) (-7.61) (-7.64) (-0.39)Growth - Neutral 3.73% 5.04% -1.75% 3.89% 4.38% 0.84% 3.87% 4.48% 0.41%t-statistic (6.78) (6.16) (-3.12) (6.50) (6.76) (1.92) (6.61) (6.81) (104)Value - Neutral -1.72% -2.54% 2.14% -2.57% -3.07% -0.01% -2.42% -2.97% 0.28%t-statistic (-5.16) (-5.80) (2.92) (-8.75) (-8.64) (-0.02) (-8.19) (-8.41) (1.00)
hedge funds, indicating in fact a higher demand for value stocks 
compared to growth stocks by hedge funds. On the other hand, 
although the magnitude of the demand difference gets smaller, it 
still remains negative in quarter q for non-hedge funds.
Panels B and C of Fig. 2 plot the differences in average quar- 
terly demand between growth and neutral stocks, and between 
value and neutral stocks, respectively, for each six quarters, again 
for hedge funds and non-hedge funds separately. The relative de- 
mand (relative to neutral stocks) for growth stocks decreases af- 
ter quarter q-2 for both hedge funds and non-hedge funds, but 
it switches from positive to negative in quarter q only for hedge 
funds. As can be seen in panel C of Fig. 2, the trend in relative de- 
mand for value stocks over quarters q-2 to q is similar, but in the 
opposite direction, with relative demand for value stocks switching 
from negative to positive only for hedge funds in quarter q.
These findings support our conjecture that hedge funds change 
their trading behavior with respect to growth and value stocks 
in quarter q, after book-to-market values become public informa- 
tion at the end of quarter q-1. Non-hedge funds also decrease (in- 
crease) their demand for growth (value) stocks in quarter q, but 
not to the same degree as hedge funds do.
5. Return predictability
5.1. Book-to-market effect and disagreement between hedge funds 
and others
After observing that both hedge funds and non-hedge funds 
in general change their trading in the same direction away from 
growth to value stocks in quarter q, in this section, we examine 
whether hedge funds or non-hedge funds are more capable of de-
Fig. 2. Difference in demand between value and growth stocks over time for hedge funds and non-hedge fundsAt the end of June of year t, five quintile portfolios are formed on the basis of book-to-market ratios measured based on the information at the end of December of year 
t-1. Panel A illustrates the difference in demand between value and growth stocks for hedge funds and non-hedge funds separately for each quarter from q-5 to q, where q is the quarter from the beginning of April of year t to the end of June of year t. Panels R and C of Figure 2 plot the difference in average quarterly demand between growth and neutral (book-to-market quintile 3) stocks and between value and neutral stocks, respectively, for hedge funds and non-hedge funds over the quarters q-5 to q. Hedge fund (Non-hedge fund) demand for each stock is measured as the change in the number of hedge funds (non-hedge funds) holding the stock from the prior quarter scaled by the average number of hedge funds (non-hedge funds) holding stocks within the same market capitalization decile. The sample period is from June 1982 to June 2013.
Table 3Independently sorted portfolios based on institutional demand and book-to-market: Hedge funds vs. Non-hedge fundsAt the end of June of year t, stocks are first independently sorted into quintiles based on the book-to-market ratios and the most recent quarter (quarter q) of non- hedge funds’ trades. Then, within the top 20% (heavy buy) and bottom 20% (heavy sell) of non-hedge funds’ trades, two sub-portfolios are created based on whether hedge funds buy or sell. For completeness of the analysis, the sorting procedure is also reversed, and this time stocks are independently sorted into quintiles based on the book-to-market ratios and the most recent quarter (quarter q) of hedge funds' trades. Then, within the top 20% (heavy buy) and bottom 20% (heavy sell) of hedge funds’ trades, two sub-portfolios are created based on whether non-hedge funds buy or sell. Portfolios are rebalanced at the end of June of each calendar year. For each sorting procedure, this table reports for the next one year (from July of year t to the end of June t + 1) the monthly CAPM alphas, Fama-French (1993) three- factor alphas, Carhart (1997) four-factor alphas and DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns for the four selected corner portfolios out of the 50 portfolios generated from the three-way independent sorting scheme. The sample period is July 1982 to June 2014. Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The numbers in bold denote significance at the 1% level.Panel A. Low book-to-market firms, Heavy BuyNONHF heavy buy HF heavy buyHF sell HF buy B-S NONHF se 11 NONHF buy B-S# of stocks 24 83 29 97CAPM alpha -1.29% -0.41% 0.88% -0.60% -0.50% 0.10%t-stat (-5.03) (-1.85) (3.90) (-1.87) (-2.31) (0.38)3-factor alpha -1.21% -0.20% 1.01% -0.43% -0.30% 0.13%t-stat (-5.53) (-1.21) (3.96) (-1.68) (-2.21) (0.48)4-factor alpha -1.02% -0.10% 0.92% -0.05% -0.16% -0.12%t-stat (-5.38) (-0.57) (3.97) (-0.16) (-1.08) (-0.39)Char. Adj. Ret. -0.72% 0.14 0.85 -0.09% -0.02% 0.07%t-stat (—3.63) (0.91) (3.72) (-0.39) (-0.13) (0.29)Panel B. High book-to-market firms, Heavy SellNONHF heavy sell HF heavy sellHF sell HF buy B-S NONHF sell NONHF buy B-S# of stocks 44 44 52 47CAPM alpha 0.24% 0.47% 0.23% 0.15% 0.34% 0.19%t-stat (0.95) (2.12) (1.40) (0.65) (1.51) (1.39)3-factor alpha -0.13% 0.18% 0.30% -0.20% 0.00% 0.20%t-stat (-0.85) (1.32) (1.85) (-1.52) (0.02) (1.40)4-factor alpha 0.18% 0.35% 0.17% 0.06% 0.13% 0.06%t-stat (1.22) (2.54) (1.04) (0.50) (0.97) (0.44)Char. Adj. Ret. 0.02% 0.04 0.02 -0.13% -0.10% 0.03%t-stat (0.05) (0.31) (0.15) (-1.00) (-0.92) (0.22)
tecting mispriced securities in relation to book-to-market anomaly. 
This type of analysis, however, requires focusing on stocks for 
which different sets of investors disagree about the mispricing. 
For this purpose, we first independently sort stocks into quintiles 
based on the book-to-market ratios and the most recent quar- 
ter (quarter q) of non-hedge funds’ demand. Then, within the 
top 20% (heavy buy) and bottom 20% (heavy sell) of non-hedge 
funds’ demand for growth and value stocks, we further create 
two portfolios contemporaneously based on whether hedge funds’ 
demand is positive (buy) or negative (sell). For completeness of 
the analysis, we also reverse the sorting procedure and indepen- 
dently sort stocks into quintiles based on the book-to-market ra- 
tios and the most recent quarter (quarter q) of hedge funds’ de- 
mand. Then, within the top 20% (heavy buy) and bottom 20% 
(heavy sell) of hedge funds’ demand for growth and value stocks, 
we further create two portfolios simultaneously based on whether 
non-hedge funds buy or sell. We rebalance these portfolios at 
the end of every June. The sample period for our return tests 
cover 384 months from July 1982 to June 2014. Table 3 reports 
the average number of stocks (within each portfolio) as well as 
the average monthly CAPM, three-factor, four-factor alphas and 
Daniel et al. (1997) (hereafter, DGTW) characteristic-adjusted re- 
turns along with heteroscedasticity-adjusted t-statistics of these al-
ternative portfolios over the one-year return measurement window 
(from July of year t to June of year t+ I), where hedge fund and 
non-hedge fund trading (demand) agree and/or disagree in quarter 
q.21
Two striking results come to the surface out of this analysis. 
First, low book-to-market (growth) stocks heavily bought (high de- 
mand) by non-hedge funds and contemporaneously sold (low de- 
mand) by hedge funds in the most recent quarter significantly un- 
derperform in the following year those growth stocks heavily pur- 
chased by non-hedge funds and simultaneously bought by hedge 
funds. The CAPM, three-, four-factor alphas and characteristic- 
adjusted returns of this underperformance are 0.88% (t-stat = 3.90), 
1.01% (t-stat = 3.96), 0.92% (t-stat = 3.97) and 0.85% (t-stat = 3.72), 
respectively (see the B-S column on the left part of Panel A of 
Table 3). Second, the underperformance is completely driven by 
the poor performance of those stocks sold by hedge funds. The 
CAPM, three-, four-factor alphas and characteristic-adjusted returns 
of growth stocks heavily bought by non-hedge funds and simulta- 
neously sold by hedge funds are -1.29% (t-stat = -5.03), -1.21% (t- 
stat= -5.53), -1.02% (t-stat =-5.38) and -0.72% (t-stat =-3.63), 
respectively.22,23 On the other hand, within the sample of low 
book-to-market growth stocks heavily bought by hedge funds, 
there is no significant difference in subsequent abnormal per- 
formances between stocks sold and stocks bought by non-hedge 
funds (see the B-S column on the right part of Panel A of Table 3).
We also repeat our main analysis for a sample of hedge funds 
with equity-based strategies only, by excluding Fixed Income Ar­
bitrage, CTAs, Managed Futures, and Emerging Market style funds 
from our sample. We find that the results from this new equity- 
based strategy only sample remain very similar to the results re- 
ported in Table 3. 24 These findings altogether suggest that hedge 
funds have superior ability to detect the overpriced growth stocks 
compared to non-hedge funds.25 Notice also in Table 3 that among 
growth stocks heavily bought by non-hedge funds, the average 
number of stocks in the portfolio where hedge funds and non- 
hedge funds disagree (24) is much smaller compared to the num- 
ber of stocks in the portfolio where they agree (83), suggest- 
ing that disagreement is much less common than agreement, and 
these rare instances of disagreement presents an opportunity to
21 The CAPM, three, and four-factor alphas are generated from the single factorCAPM, 3-factor model of Fama and French (1993), and 4-factor model of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997), respectively. The characteristic- adjusted returns for each stock in each month is computed as the return difference between a stock and a portfolio of stocks that have comparable characteristics in terms of size, in- dustry adjusted book-to-market value, and prior returns. For complete details, refer to Daniel et al. (1997).22 Note that these results on low book-to-market stocks are not driven from the inclusion of the HML factor in the estimation of three- and four-factor alphas. Ex- cluding the HML factor in estimation of the three- and four-factor alphas generate similar in magnitude negative and statistically significant alphas for those growth stocks heavily bought by non-hedge funds and simultaneously sold by hedge funds.23 It should be noted that this significant underperformance is not driven by out- lier stock returns. When we exclude the most negative and the most positive re- turns within this portfolio each month, the monthly three- and four-factor alphas turn out to be -1.38% and -1.21%, respectively, with the corresponding t-statistics of -6.25 and -6.36.24 These results are not tabulated for the sake of brevity, but available upon re- quest.25 Following Cao et al. (2017), we estimate for our portfolio of interest, the four- factor alphas of individual securities by using daily returns in quarter q-1. Specifi- cally, we find the average of the four-factor daily alphas of growth stocks sold by hedge funds and bought by non-hedge funds to be 0.082% in quarter q-1. When we exclude the stocks with one-tail negative significant alphas from our analysis, we observe that the subsequent year portfolio returns for the portfolio of growth stocks sold by hedge funds and bought by non-hedge funds remain qualitatively unchanged from Table 3.
test the relative ability of hedge funds to detect overpriced growth 
securities.26
On the other hand, a similar analysis for value stocks in Panel B 
of Table 3 shows that hedge funds’ disagreement with non-hedge 
funds do not generate as significant abnormal returns (in absolute 
terms) as they do for growth stocks. Within high book-to-market 
value stocks heavily sold by non-hedge funds and contemporane- 
ously bought by hedge funds, we observe a monthly CAPM and 
four-factor alpha of 0.47% (t-stat = 2.12) and 0.35% (t-stat = 2.54), 
respectively. However, the same figure turns out to be insignificant 
for the three-factor model and characteristic-adjusted returns, in- 
dicating a somewhat weaker evidence of hedge funds’ ability to 
detect underpriced value securities. Lastly, in our analysis within 
the sample of high book-to-market value stocks heavily sold by 
hedge funds, we find no significant difference in subsequent ab- 
normal performances between stocks sold and stocks bought by 
non-hedge funds (see the B-S column on the right part of Panel B 
of Table 3).27
In sum, we find evidence indicating that hedge funds have su­
perior ability to detect overpriced growth stocks compared to non-
hedge funds. However, we find no significant evidence of such abil- 
ity when it comes to detecting underpriced value stocks. This dif- 
ference in our findings, however, can be explained by the asym- 
metry in arbitrage. Due to short selling constraints, overpricing 
can persist for some time, while underpricing is likely to dissipate 
quickly as there are no constraints to buying stocks.
5.2. Do stock characteristics explain what hedge funds capture?
In the previous section, we show that hedge funds are bet- 
ter able to detect over-priced stocks with low book-to-market ra- 
tios. In this section, we attempt to understand if the differences in 
stock returns during the return measurement window are due to 
the behavior of the two types of institutions or simply due to dif- 
ferences in stock characteristics. In other words, we investigate if 
hedge funds are paying attention to some public information that 
non-hedge funds do not. For this purpose, we compare the charac- 
teristics of the stocks sold by hedge funds to the characteristics of 
stocks bought by hedge funds within the group of growth stocks 
heavily bought by non-hedge funds in quarter q.
We take into account a broad range of characteristics includ- 
ing hedge fund demand, non-hedge fund demand, and total in- 
stitutional demand both in quarter q and during quarters q-5 to 
q-2. We also compare for the portfolios of interest, the book-to- 
market ratio, firm size, share price, illiquidity, idiosyncratic volatil- 
ity, past one-year intangible return, momentum, and standard- 
ized earnings surprises (SUE). Lastly, we also evaluate raw and 
market-adjusted cumulative stock returns for the portfolios of in- 
terest for quarter q and quarter q-1, separately. For illiquidity, 
we use Amihud (2002) stock illiquidity measure, which is de-
fined as the ratio of the absolute return to the dollar trading vol- 
ume averaged over the three months in quarter q. To measure 
idiosyncratic volatility, we use the standard deviation of resid- 
uals from the regressions of daily stock returns on Fama and 
French (1993) three factor model over the three months in quar- 
ter q. For intangible returns, we follow Daniel and Titman (2006), 
and estimate it as the residual of the annual cross-sectional regres- 
sions of log stock returns on the lagged log book-to-market ratio 
and past one-year book returns of stocks. Momentum is defined as 
the past 12 months’ cumulative stock returns excluding the most 
recent month. Finally, for standardized earnings surprises (SUE), 
we follow Chordia and Shivakumar (2006), and compute SUE as 
SUEi,q = (Ei,q-Ei,q-4)/Stdi,q, where Ei,q is the earnings for firm i in 
quarter q, and stdi,q is the standard deviation of the (Ei,q-Ei,q-4) 
over the prior eight quarters.
Table 4 presents the time-series averages of the mean, median, 
first and last quartiles of the characteristics of the portfolios of in- 
terest. First, among growth stocks heavily bought by non-hedge 
funds, we observe that stocks sold by hedge funds in quarter q 
have a lower demand by non-hedge funds in the same quarter 
as well (30.32% vs. 37.17%). Among growth stocks heavily bought 
by non-hedge funds and simultaneously sold by hedge funds, we 
also see that the total institutional demand in quarter q is posi- 
tive (16.34%), suggesting that the consequent significant underper- 
formance of these low book-to-market stocks cannot be explained 
by any price pressure. In addition, in Table 4 we also notice that 
for those stocks that are sold by hedge funds in quarter q, the in- 
stitutional demand during the preceding five quarters (from q-5 
to q-1) is noticeably stronger compared to those stocks bought by 
hedge funds (14.83% vs. 10.34%). Interestingly, we observe a simi- 
lar pattern in the preceding five quarters in both hedge fund de- 
mand (26.31% vs. 12.25%) and non-hedge fund demand (12.63% vs. 
10.01%). In other words, those growth stocks that are sold by hedge 
funds in quarter q tend to be the stocks that have been subject to 
stronger institutional demand during the preceding five quarters.
Our results, however, do not reveal an outstanding difference in 
book-to-market ratio, firm size, share price, illiquidity and idiosyn- 
cratic volatility between stocks sold and stocks bought by hedge 
funds among the group of growth stocks heavily bought by non- 
hedge funds. It is worth noting that the average market capital- 
ization of stocks sold by hedge funds is $726 million, which is ap- 
proximately equivalent to the third NYSE size decile. As small firms 
face greater short-selling constraints, this provides support for our 
explanation of overpricing of growth stocks for which hedge funds 
and non-hedge funds disagree. Lastly, for stocks sold by hedge 
funds, the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure of 0.191 is almost 
half of the illiquidity measure of 0.351 averaged over all growth 
stocks. This further suggests that illiquidity does not seem to be a 
main driving force behind the significant underperformance of the 
portfolio of interest.
Lastly, we examine when the underperformance of these 
growth stocks sold by hedge funds begins. One possibility is that it 
begins while hedge funds trade during quarter q or another pos- 
sibility is that the underperformance begins during quarter q-1 
(January to March). These scenarios may cast doubt on our inter- 
pretation that hedge funds correctly identify which growth stocks 
will underperform. Table 4 shows, however, no evidence for such 
an earlier underperformance. In fact, for those growth stocks sold 
by hedge funds, the portfolio return in excess of the market re- 
turn is positive and its magnitude is 3.38% and 5.62% during the 
quarters q and q-1, respectively. Furthermore, in quarter q where 
we measure institutional demand, stocks sold by hedge funds have 
still a positive average earnings surprise (0.77). These results sug- 
gest that the growth stocks sold by hedge funds in quarter q, were 
not already underperforming during quarters q or q-1, and there 
were no signs of negative earnings surprises either. We also find
Table 4Characteristics of stocks bought vs. stocks sold by hedge funds among growth stocks heavily bought by Non-hedge funds in quarter qThe table reports the time-series averages of the mean, median, first, and last quartiles of stock characteristics for the portfolios of stocks sold and stocks bought by hedge funds within the sample of growth stocks heavily bought by non- hedge funds. At the end of June of year t, stocks are first independently sorted into quintiles based on the book-to-market ratios and the most recent quarter (quarter q) of non-hedge funds' trades. Then, within the top 20% (heavy buy) of non- hedge funds’ trades of growth (low book-to-market) stocks, two sub-portfolios are created based on whether hedge funds buy or sell. Portfolios are rebalanced at the end of June of each calendar year. Hedge fund (Non-hedge fund) demand for each stock is measured as the change in the number of hedge funds (non-hedge funds) holding the stock from the prior quarter scaled by the average number of hedge funds (non-hedge funds) holding stocks within the same market capitalization decile. Similarly, institutional demand for each stock is measured as the change in the number of institutions holding the stock from the prior quarter scaled by the average number of institutions holding stocks within the same market capitalization decile. Illiquidity is the average ratio of the daily absolute return to the dollar trading volume in quarter q. Idiosyncratic volatility is the standard deviation of residuals of the regression of daily stock returns on Fama and French (1993) three factor model over the three months in quarter q. Return (q) and Return (q-1) are the cumulative stock returns over the quarters q and q-1, respectively. Similarly, Excess Return (q) and Excess Return (q-1) are the cumulative stock returns in excess of the market return over the quarters q and q-1, respectively. The intangible return is the residual from the regression of the past one-year log returns on the lagged book-to-market ratio and book returns as in Daniel and Titman (2006). Momentum measures the past 12 months' cumulative returns from July of year t-1 to June of year t. SUE (q) is computed as the earnings surprise in quarter q scaled by the standard deviation of the earnings surprises over the prior eight quarters. The earnings surprise in quarter q is measured as the difference between quarter q earnings and quarter q-4 earnings. The sample period is 1982 to 2013.Mean Median Q1 Q3HF sell HF Buy HF sell HF Buy HF sell HF Buy HF sell HF BuyΔ#inst. (q) 16.34% 41.02% 13.72% 32.83% 8.59% 23.47% 21.34% 55.39%Δ#HF (q) -55.32% 66.69% -44.53% 49.33% -88.32% 26.93% -21.65% 97.23%Δ#NHF (q) 30.32% 37.17% 25.34% 29.35% 18.88% 20.46% 35.17% 48.63%Avg. Δ#inst. (q-5, q-1) 14.83% 10.34% 12.34% 8.68% 5.50% 3.16% 21.50% 16.42%Avg. Δ#HF (q-5, q-1) 26.31% 12.25% 22.66% 9.03% 7.78% 1.42% 42.11% 21.48%
Avg. A#NHF (q-5, q-1) 12.63% 10.01% 10.31% 8.35% 3.97% 3.02% 19.49% 15.61%B/M 0.197 0.191 0.208 0.199 0.143 0.133 0.255 0.252Size (in millions) 726.42 1094.58 312.91 374.71 165.10 182.90 776.45 904.16Price 21.18 24.71 17.19 20.24 10.53 12.35 28.47 32.58Ivol 0.031 0.031 0.030 0.029 0.023 0.023 0.038 0.037Illiquidity 0.191 0.174 0.048 0.036 0.019 0.011 0.176 0.128Intangible return 44.72% 46.32% 43.12% 45.90% 16.27% 17.99% 75.36% 75.25%Momentum 48.66% 76.68% 33.34% 58.67% -1.01% 20.31% 81.14% 118.41%Return (q) 6.69% 19.77% 5.89% 16.65% -9.80% 1.10% 20.65% 34.62%Return (q-1) 9.57% 15.48% 6.07% 11.75% -9.74% -3.96% 24.75% 30.23%Excess Return (q) 3.38% 16.13% 2.39% 13.11% -12.70% -2.06% 16.82% 30.80%Excess Return (q-1) 5.62% 11.34% 2.23% 7.57% -13.18% -7.66% 20.41% 25.46%SUE(q) 0.77 0.97 0.60 0.70 -0.17 0.07 1.61 1.89
no difference in intangible returns between stocks sold and stocks 
bought by hedge funds within the sample of stocks heavily bought 
by non-hedge funds (44.72% vs. 46.32%). Lastly, we find the mo­
mentum (past 12 months’ cumulative performance excluding the 
most recent month) to be somewhat lower for the stocks sold by 
hedge funds (48.66% vs. 76.68%), the only category where there 
seems to be a difference between stocks sold and stocks bought 
by hedge funds.28
We next employ multivariate Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional re- 
gressions of monthly stock returns on previous quarters’ institu- 
tional demand as well as stock characteristics in quarter q, to see 
if the above mentioned differences undermine the role of hedge 
funds’ superior ability to detect overpriced growth stocks. To ex- 
plain the monthly individual stock returns in the cross-section, we 
use the same aforementioned variables, including hedge fund and 
non-hedge fund demand in quarter q, total institutional demand 
during the preceding five quarters from quarters q-5 to q-1, the
natural logarithm of firm size at the end of June of year t, the nat­
ural logarithm of the book-to-market ratio at the end of December 
of year t-1, past 12 month’s cumulative performance excluding the 
most recent month, illiquidity, idiosyncratic volatility, the intangi- 
ble return, and the standardized unexpected earnings at the end 
of June of year t. In Table 5, we run three alternative regression 
specifications for low book-to-market growth stocks heavily bought 
by non-hedge funds. The sample period is July 1982 to June 2014, 
covering 384 months. Note that we winsorize all independent vari- 
ables at the 1% level, and control for heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlations in all of our analyses.
Table 5 reports the average slope coefficients along with t- 
statistics and p-values from the monthly cross-sectional regres- 
sions (from July of year t to June of year t+1) of future stock 
returns on hedge fund and non-hedge fund demand in quarter 
q with and without control variables. The findings from Fama- 
MacBeth cross-sectional regressions confirm our key finding that 
hedge funds’ trading (demand) positively predicts the future re- 
turns of growth stocks that are heavily bought by non-hedge funds. 
In the first model where only hedge fund and non-hedge fund 
demand are used as explanatory variables, the slope coefficients 
on hedge fund and non-hedge fund demand are 0.006 with a t- 
statistic of 2.35 and -0.004 with a t-statistic of -0.74, respectively. 
In the second model, we add total institutional demand during the 
preceding five quarters from quarters q-5 to q-1 to the regression
Table 5Fama-MacBeth regressions of future stock returns on institutional demand and stock characteristics within the sample of growth stocks heavily bought by non-hedge fundsWithin the sample of growth stocks heavily purchased by non-hedge funds, this table reports aver- age coefficient estimates along with their (-statistics (in parenthesis) and p-values from the monthly cross-sectional regressions (from July of year t through June of t + 1) of future stock returns on hedge fund and non-hedge fund demand in quarter q and control variables. Hedge fund (Non-hedge fund) demand in quarter q for each stock is measured as the change in the number of hedge funds (non-hedge funds) holding the stock from the prior quarter scaled by the average number of hedge funds (non-hedge funds) holding stocks at the end of q-1 within the same market capitalization decile. Similarly, institutional demand from q-5 to q-1 for each stock is measured as the change in the number of institutions holding the stock from q-5 to q-1 scaled by the average number of institutions holding stocks at the end of q-5 within the same market capitalization decile. The con- trol variables for stock characteristics include (1) natural log of book-to-market ratio, (2) natural log of firm size, (3) prior 12 months’ cumulative returns (momentum), (4) Illiquidity, (5) Idiosyncratic volatility, (6) SUE measured in quarter q, and (7) intangible return. All independent variables are calculated as described in Table 4 as of June end of year t. All independent variables are winsorized at 1% level. Standard errors are corrected for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. The sample period is July 1982 to June 2014. The numbers in bold denote significance at the 1% level.Intercept Δ#HF (q) Δ#NHF (q) A#inst. (q-5, q-1) Stock Characteristics0.007 0.006 -0.004Model 1 (175) (2.35) (-0.74) No0.081 0.019 0.4600.008 0.006 -0.004 -0.002Model 2 (2.11) (2.39) (-0.72) (-1.49) No0.035 0.018 0.472 0.1360.015 0.006 0.000 -0.003Model 3 (2.01) (2.85) (0.04) (-1.87) Yes0.045 0.005 0.970 0.063
model as well, and find that the coefficient on hedge fund demand 
is still 0.006 with a t-statistic of 2.39, indicating that controlling for 
the effect of institutional demand during the preceding five quar- 
ters does not eradicate the predictive power of quarter q hedge 
fund demand on future stock returns. Lastly, in the third model, we 
add all stock characteristics, including book-to-market, firm size, 
momentum, illiquidity, idiosyncratic volatility, and SUE into our 
regression model, and still find a statistically significant relation 
between hedge fund demand and subsequent returns; an average 
slope coefficient of 0.006 with a t-statistic of 2.85 on hedge fund 
demand.29
To sum up, the findings from the cross-sectional regression 
analyses confirm our portfolio test results and suggest that hedge 
funds’ superior ability to detect overpriced growth stocks is not 
driven by other firm characteristics such as size, illiquidity, idiosyn­
cratic volatility, SUE and past returns.
5.3. The role of disagreement in the full cross-section of stock returns
The results from the portfolio level analysis show that the dis- 
agreement between hedge funds and other institutions in quarter 
q play a major role in predicting the future underperformance of 
growth stocks. More specifically, growth stocks heavily bought by 
other institutions and simultaneously sold by hedge funds in quar- 
ter q underperform significantly in the following period. In this 
section, using the full cross-section of stock returns, we test for 
the existence of a possible asymmetry of such negative underper- 
formance in relation to the growth stocks and institutional demand 
over the preceding five quarters from q-5 to q-2.
Table 6 presents results from a set of Fama-MacBeth regres- 
sions of future monthly stock returns on the disagreement be- 
tween hedge funds and other institutions, past institutional de- 
mand, and stock characteristics. We first create a Disagreement 
dummy variable that is observed at the end of June of year t (quar- 
ter q) and takes the value of 1 when a stock is heavily bought
by non-hedge funds (i.e., top 20% of non-hedge fund demand) and 
sold by hedge funds in quarter q, and 0 otherwise. We next create 
a Growth dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a stock is in 
the lowest book-to-market quintile in quarter q, and 0 otherwise. 
Our measure of institutional demand from q-5 to q-2, Ainst(q-5, 
q-2), is the scaled change in the number of institutions for a stock 
over the five quarters from q-5 to q-2. We also create a High Insti­
tutional Demand dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a stock 
is in the top Ainst(q-5, q-2) quintile in quarter q, and 0 other- 
wise. We include in the regression models the interaction terms of 
the dummy variables to capture any asymmetries as well. Lastly, in 
all of the cross-sectional regressions, we include control variables 
including, the natural log of firm size, the natural log of book-to- 
market ratio, the return over the past one year excluding the most 
recent month ending in May of year t, the illiquidity measure, the 
idiosyncratic volatility, the standardized earnings surprises, and the 
intangible return.30 The independent variables are updated at the 
end of June of year t. Thus, they are the same for 12 monthly re- 
gressions from July of year t to June of year t + I. Coefficient esti- 
mates in Table 6 are time-series averages of monthly coefficients, 
and t-statistics are based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors 
using six-lags.
Model 1 in Table 6 examines the predictive power of the dis- 
agreement between hedge funds and non-hedge funds across all 
stocks controlling for the stock characteristics. The overall relation 
between disagreement and future returns is negative and statis- 
tically significant, with an average coefficient of -0.0019 on the 
Disagreement dummy and a t-statistic of -2.36. Model 2 exam- 
ines if this negative relation is symmetric across growth vs. other 
stocks, by including the interaction of Disagreement dummy with 
Growth dummy in the regression equation. Notably, the coefficient
Table 6Fama-MacBeth regressions of future stock returns on the disagreement in quarter q, long term institutional demand and stock characteristicsThis table reports average coefficient estimates along with their t-statistics (in parenthesis) and p-values from the monthly cross-sectional regressions (from July of year t through June of t + 1) of future stock returns on the disagreement dummy in quarter q, preceding five quarter institutional demand Δinst(q-5, q-1), and stock characteristics. The disagreement dummy takes the value of 1 when a stock is heavily bought by non-hedge funds (i.e,, top 20% of non- hedge fund demand) and sold by hedge funds in quarter q, and 0 otherwise. The disagreement dummy variable’s interactions with growth stocks and high institutional demand are also controlled in regression specifications 2-4. Growth dummy is generated such that it takes the value of 1 if a stock is in the lowest book-to-market quintile in quarter q, and 0 otherwise. High Institutional Demand dummy is created such that it takes the value of 1 if a stock is in the top Δinst(q-5, q-1) quintile in quarter q, and 0 otherwise. The control variables for stock characteristics include (1) natural log of book-to-market ratio, (2) natural log of firm size, (3) prior 12 months' cumulative returns (momentum), (4) Illiquidity, (5) Idiosyncratic volatility, (6) SUE measured in quarter q, and (7) intangible return. All independent variables are calculated as described in Table 4 as of June end of year t. All continuous independent variables are winsorized at 1% level. Standard errors are corrected for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. The sample period is July 1982 to June 2014. The numbers in bold denote significance at the 1% level.Model Intercept Disagreement Disagreement x Growth Disagreement x High Inst. Demand (q-5, q-1) Δinst. {q-5,q-1) Characteristics0.0154 -0.00191 (4.71) (-2.36) Yes<0.001 0.0190.0154 -0.0006 -0.00652 (4.70) (-0.63) (-3.18) Yes<0.001 0.526 0.0020.0156 0.0002 -0.0060 -0.00183 (4.87) (0.23) (-3.58) (-3.26) Yes<0.001 0.816 <0.001 0.0010.0156 0.0010 -0.0050 -0.0054 -0.00184 (4.86) (1.06) (-2.39) (-3.17) (-3.26) Yes<0.001 0.290 0.017 0.002 0.001
on the Disagreement dummy drops to zero and becomes statistically 
insignificant, while the interaction term (Disagreement dummy x 
Growth dummy) captures the negative predictive power of the dis- 
agreement with an average coefficient of -0.0065 and a t-statistic 
of -3.18. This asymmetry suggests that the predictive ability of the 
disagreement between hedge funds and other institutions in quar- 
ter q is limited to growth stocks.
In Model 3, we next include institutional demand over the pre- 
ceding five quarters, Ainst(q-5, q-1), and the interaction between 
Disagreement dummy and High institutional Demand dummy in the 
regression equation. We find a significant and negative relation be- 
tween institutional demand, Ainst(q-5, q-1), and future returns, 
which is consistent with prior studies (e.g., Jiang (2010), Dasgupta 
et al. (2011), and Edelen et al. (2016)) which document a nega- 
tive relation between institutional investors’ past long term trading 
and future stock returns. Furthermore, we find the interaction term 
(Disagreement dummy x High Institutional Demand dummy) has a 
larger average coefficient of -0.0060 with a t-statistic of -3.58. 
This finding suggests that the negative predictive power of dis- 
agreement is also confined to those stocks which have been sub- 
ject to high level of institutional demand in the past.
Lastly, Model 4 includes interactions of Disagreement dummy 
with Growth dummy and Disagreement dummy with High Institu- 
tional Demand dummy simultaneously. The results show that the 
disagreement-growth relation is robust to the control of past in- 
stitutional demand. The coefficient on the interaction term (Dis- 
agreement dummy x Growth dummy) is -0.0050 with a t-statistic 
of -2.39. Hence, any correlation between disagreement in quarter 
q and past institutional demand over q-5 to q-1 does not explain 
the future underperformance of growth stocks which are heav- 
ily bought by non-hedge funds and simultaneously sold by hedge 
funds in quarter q.
Taken in their entirety, the results in this section show that the 
negative relation between disagreement in quarter q and future re- 
turns is confined to growth stocks and to those stocks invested 
heavily by institutions over the preceding five quarters from q-5 
to q-1. However, these two effects do not subsume each other.
6. Robustness check
6.1. Quarterly returns
Prior literature provide evidence that the ability of institu- 
tional trades predicting future returns depend on the horizons 
over which both trading and returns are measured.32 Edelen et al. 
(2016) provide evidence that institutions trading in quarter q based 
on the anomalies (e.g., buy minus sell portfolios within growth and 
value stocks) generates positive alphas confined only to next two 
quarters following the portfolio formation, which is consistent with 
the price pressure effect rather than the institutional investors’ 
ability to pick stocks. We examine whether the significant subse- 
quent year underperformance of growth stocks heavily bought by 
non-hedge funds and simultaneously sold by hedge funds is driven 
by the poor performance in a specific quarter.
Table 7 documents the average monthly CAPM, three-, four- 
factor alphas and DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns for the 
portfolios of interest for each of the four quarters. We find the next 
one-year underperformance of low book-to-market stocks heav- 
ily bought by non-hedge funds and contemporaneously sold by 
hedge funds in quarter q is not confined to a specific quarter. The 
weakest negative alphas are in q + 2, where the monthly three- 
and four-factor alphas are -1.05% (t-stat=-2.02) and -0.79% (t- 
stat=-1.95), respectively, while the strongest alphas are in q+4 
where three- and four-factor alphas are -1.30% (t-stat = -3.21) 
and -1.23% (t-stat=-3.39), respectively.33 Thus, the results from 
Table 7 show that hedge fund’s detection of over-priced stocks in 
quarter q and those stocks’ significant underperformance in the
Table 7Future quarterly returns of growth stocks heavily bought by non-hedge funds in quarter qStocks are first independently sorted into quintiles based on the book-to-market ratios and the most recent quarter (quarter q) of non-hedge funds’ trades. Then, within the top 20% (heavy buy) of non- hedge funds’ trades of growth (low book-to-market) stocks in quarter q, two sub-portfolios are created based on whether hedge funds buy or sell. Portfolios are rebalanced at the end of June of each calendar year. The table reports for each of the next four calendar quarters (from July of year t to the end of June t + 1) the monthly CAPM alphas, Fama-French (1993) three-factor alphas, Carhart (1997' four-factor alphas and DGTW (1997) characteristic-adjusted returns of the two aforementioned sub-portfolios in question. The sample period is July 1982 to June 2014. Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The numbers in bold denote significance at the 5% level or better.
Qtr NONHF heavy buyHF sell(< 0) HF buy(>0)CAPM alpha -1.71% -0.02%t-stat (-3.90) (-0.04)3-factor alpha -1.35% 0.54%t-stat (-3.66) (1.87)
q + I (July, August, September) 4-factor alpha -1.09% 0.68%t-stat (-2.84) (2.20)Char. Adj. Ret. -0.95% 0.45%t-stat (-2.87) (1.43)CAPM alpha -1.33% -0.52%t-stat (-2.26) (-1.06)3-factor alpha -1.05% -0.22%t-stat (-2.02) (-0.70)
q + 2 (October, November, December) 4-factor alpha -0.79% -0.08%t-stat (-1.95) (-0.26)Char. Adj. Ret. -0.42% 0.33t-stat (-1.99) (1.10)CAPM alpha -0.84% -0.76%t-stat (-1.64) (-1.84)3-factor alpha -1.12% -0.83%t-stat (-2.81) (-2.69)
q + 3 (January, February, March) 4-factor alpha -0.96% -0.75%t-stat (-2.57) (-2.33)Char. Adj. Ret. -0.63 -0.29t-stat (-1.97) (-1.08)CAPM alpha -1.25% -0.35%t-stat (-2.61) (-0.81)3-factor alpha -1.30% -0.31%t-stat (-3.21) (-1.09)
q + 4 (April, May, June) 4-factor alpha -1.23% -0.28%t-stat (-3.39) (-1.03)Char. Adj. Ret. -0.88% 0.06%t-stat (-2.37) (0.20)
subsequent year is not due to a large underperformance in a spe­
cific quarter. That is, the underperformance persists in all four 
quarters, suggesting that hedge fund demand (within the universe 
of growth stocks heavily bought by non-hedge funds) is a robust 
indicator of future quarterly returns as well.
The quarterly return analysis reported in Table 7 also reveals 
an interesting trading strategy based on the disagreement between 
hedge funds and other institutions with respect to the book-to- 
market effect. Specifically, we suggest an enhanced book-to-market 
return spread by taking short positions in growth stocks sold by 
hedge funds and heavily bought by other institutions, and by tak- 
ing long positions in value stocks sold heavily by other institu- 
tions and bought by hedge funds. Such a strategy, skipping the 
first three months after the end of June of year t (i.e., the standard 
portfolio formation calendar month in the relevant literature), can 
be formed at the end of September of year t after observing the 
quarter q trades of institutions during the q + 1 period. This zero- 
cost investment portfolio strategy held over a nine-month period 
yields an average monthly three-factor alpha of 1.39% (1.18% (short 
side)+ 0.22% (long side)).34
6.2. Sub-period analysis
The Lipper TASS starts including defunct funds in the database 
starting from 1994. Therefore, we may be missing from our analy- 
ses some hedge funds that have shut down before 1994. The ex- 
istence of survivorship bias in the TASS database prior to 1994 
may have an effect on our full sample results. In addition, book- 
to-market’s recognition as an anomaly starting with Fama and 
French (1992), might have reduced the magnitude of the anomaly 
in following years, moderating the size of the abnormal returns 
that can be generated on those growth stocks heavily bought by 
non-hedge funds and simultaneously sold by hedge funds. In order 
to address these potential concerns, we examine whether the full 
sample results vary over time. To this end, we divide our full sam- 
ple period July 1982 to June 2014 covering 384 months into two 
sample periods; July 1982 to June 1995, and July 1995 to June 2014. 
We report the average monthly CAPM, three-factor, four-factor al- 
phas, and DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns of portfolios of 
interest along with their t-statistics in these two sub-periods in 
Table 8.
Table 8Sub-period analysis of growth stocks heavily bought by non-hedge fundsStocks are first independently sorted into quintiles based on the book-to-market ratios and the most re- cent quarter (quarter q) of non-hedge funds’ trades. Then, within the top 20% (heavy buy) of non-hedge funds' trades of growth (low book-to-market) stocks, two sub-portfolios are created based on whether hedge funds buy or sell. The portfolio return measurement window is from July of year t to June of year t + 1. Portfolios are rebalanced at the end of June of each calendar year. For each sub-sample pe- riod, the table reports for the next one year (from July of year t to the end of June t + 1) the monthly CAPM alphas, Fama-French (1993) three-factor alphas, Carhart (1997) four-factor alphas and DGTW (1997) characteristic-adjusted returns of the two aforementioned sub-portfolios in question. The two subsample periods are July 1982 to June 1995, and July 1995 to June 2014. Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The numbers in bold denote significance at the 1% level.July 1982 to June 1995 July 1995 to June 2014HF sell(< 0) HF buy(>0) Buy-Sell HF sell(< 0) HF buy(>0) Buy-SellCAPM alpha -1.42% —0.63% 0.79% -1.18% -0.26% 0.92%t-stat (-3.78) (-1.93) (2.51) (-3.32) (-0.88) (2.82)3-factor alpha -0.98% -0.13% 0.85% -1.23% -0.21% 1.02%t-stat (-3.77) (-0.47) (2.62) (-3.98) (-1.03) (2.81)4-factor alpha -1.02% -0.18% 0.84% -1.02% -0.08% 0.94%t-stat (-3.86) (-0.63) (2.35) (-4.13) (-0.37) (2.90)Char. Adj. Ret -0.58% 0.19% 0.77% -0.81% 0.10 0.91t-stat (-2.45) (0.77) (2.49) (-3.15) (0.53) (3.21)
The results presented in Table 8 confirm the existence and con- 
tinuation of a significant underperformance of growth stocks heav- 
ily bought by non-hedge funds and contemporaneously sold by 
hedge funds in the more recent survivorship bias free period (July 
1995 to June 2014) as well. The low book-to-market stocks heav- 
ily bought by non-hedge funds and sold by hedge funds yield a 
monthly three-factor alpha of -0.98% (t-stat = — 3.77) for the ear- 
lier sub-sample period and a monthly three-factor alpha of -1.23% 
(t-stat = -3.98) for the more recent sub-sample period. The results 
are similar for the four-factor alphas and DGTW characteristic- 
adjusted returns as well.
In sum, our main results from the full sample period hold for 
both of the sub-periods, suggesting that our findings are robust 
and are not driven by the survivorship bias that exists in the hedge 
fund database prior to 1994.35
6.3. The effect of small number of stocks on portfolio returns
In our analyses most of the return predictability tests are con- 
ducted on the subset of growth stocks that are heavily bought by 
non-hedge funds. Among these stocks, the significant results are 
generated from a subset of stocks that are sold by hedge funds 
(24 stocks on average as reported in Table 3). The small number 
of stocks in the portfolio of interest may raise concerns about the 
generalizability of our findings. To that end, we examine the time- 
series variation in portfolio size (i.e., the number of stocks in the 
portfolio) for portfolios of growth stocks heavily bought by non- 
hedge funds and simultaneously sold by hedge funds. In Fig. 3, we 
illustrate a histogram of the number of stocks in the portfolio of 
interest covering the full sample period of 384 months. While the 
average numbers of stocks in our portfolio of interest is 24, the 
minimum number of stocks goes down below 10 to only 9 only 
once. More importantly, in 300 out of the 384 months (i.e., 78% 
of the time), the portfolio of interest has more than 15 stocks at 
a given point in time. We next check the effect of small num- 
ber of stocks (in the portfolio of interest) on our main findings. 
We find that when the months with portfolios with less than 20 
stocks are excluded from the analysis, the monthly CAPM, three- 
factor, four-factor alphas, and DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns 
of the growth stocks heavily bought by non-hedge funds and sold
by hedge funds turn out to be -0.98% (t-stat =-3.27), -0.98% (t- 
stat=-3.83), -0.90% (t-stat =-3.64), and -0.66% (t-stat =-3.02), 
respectively. This shows that the extreme small number of stocks 
does not have any significant impact on our main findings.
In order to further address the issue and ease concerns about 
the effect of small number of stocks on our main findings, we re- 
peat our trivariate portfolio analysis by expanding the number of 
stocks in our portfolio of interest. To this end, each year we sort 
the stocks based on the previous fiscal year-end book-to-market 
ratios and identify the top 30 percentile (value) and the bottom 
30 percentile (growth) stocks. We also sort stocks independently 
based on their quarter q non-hedge fund demand and identify the 
top 30 percentile (heavy buy) and bottom 30 percentile (heavy 
sell) stocks. Then, within the top 30% (heavy buy) and bottom 
30% (heavy sell) of non-hedge funds’ demand for value and growth 
stocks, we further create two portfolios contemporaneously based 
on whether hedge funds’ demand is positive (buy) or negative 
(sell). Generating trivariate portfolios in this format by focusing on 
the top and bottom 30% (as opposed to 20%) of book-to-market 
ratios and non-hedge fund demand increases the average num- 
ber of stocks in the portfolio of interest to 63 from 24. We next 
compute the average monthly CAPM, three-factor, four-factor al- 
phas, and DGTW characteristic adjusted returns of these alternative 
portfolios (with larger number of stocks) over the one-year return 
measurement window.
Similar to our results reported in Panel A of Table 3, growth 
stocks heavily bought by non-hedge funds and contemporaneously 
sold by hedge funds significantly underperform in the following 
year those growth stocks heavily purchased by non-hedge funds 
and simultaneously bought by hedge funds. The CAPM, three- 
factor, four-factor alphas, and DGTW characteristic-adjusted re- 
turns of this underperformance are 0.31% (t-stat = 2.41), 0.42% (t- 
stat = 3.18), 0.34% (t-stat = 2.85), and 0.43% (t-stat = 2.89), respec- 
tively. More importantly, this underperformance is mainly due to 
the poor performance of those stocks sold by hedge funds. The 
CAPM, three-factor, four-factor alphas, and DGTW characteristic- 
adjusted returns of growth stocks heavily bought by non-hedge 
funds and simultaneously sold by hedge funds are -0.62% (t- 
stat=-3.25), -0.56% (t-stat =-4.09), -0.41% (t-stat =-3.20), and 
-0.38% (t-stat =-3.01), respectively, when the average number of 
stocks in the portfolio is 63, much higher than the original 24
Fig. 3. Histogram of the number of growth stocks heavily bought by non-hedge funds and simultaneously sold by hedge funds in quarter qAt the end of June of year t, stocks are first independently sorted into quintiles based on the book-to-market ratios and the most recent quarter (quarter q) of non-hedge funds' trades. Then, within the top 20% (heavy buy) of non-hedge funds’ trades of growth (low book-to-market) stocks, two sub-portfolios are created based on whether hedge funds buy or sell. This figure reports the number of times (months) how many stocks appeared in the portfolio of interest. The portfolio of interest is the portfolio of growth stocks heavily bought by non-hedge funds and simultaneously sold by hedge funds in quarter q.
stocks in the portfolio.36 Therefore, our inferences regarding the 
superior ability of hedge funds in detecting overpriced growth 
stocks remain the same even when we expand the number of 
stocks in our portfolio of interest.
Finally, one last related possible concern might be the effect of 
extreme outliers on the large negative alphas when the number 
of stocks in the portfolio of interest is low. As an additional ro- 
bustness check, each month we exclude from our original trivariate 
portfolios the stocks with the minimum and maximum monthly 
returns. When these two stocks are excluded from our analy- 
ses, the monthly CAPM, three-factor, four-factor alphas, and DGTW 
characteristic-adjusted returns of the growth stocks heavily bought 
by non-hedge funds and sold by hedge funds become -1.46%, 
-1.38%, -1.21%, and -0.93%, respectively, and still statistically sig- 
nificant at the 1% level, again showing no significant change from 
the full sample results. All in all, we can conclude that the small 
number of stocks in our portfolio of interest does not seem to have 
any significant impact on our main findings.
7. Conclusion
Recent studies find that institutional investors’ actions as a 
whole group exacerbate the price overreaction, contributing to the 
book-to-market effect (see, e.g., Jiang, 2010 and Edelen et al., 2016). 
We examine whether a prominent sub-group of institutional in- 
vestors, i.e., hedge funds, act in the same manner as most other in- 
stitutions, and fail to take advantage of the arbitrage opportunities
generated by the value premium. We find that hedge funds change 
their preference from growth stocks to value stocks in the quarter 
immediately after the book-to-market values of all stocks become 
public information. However, the finding that hedge funds change 
their trading preferences with respect to growth and value stocks 
does not necessarily mean that they have superior ability to detect 
mispriced securities among growth and value stocks compared to 
other institutional investors. For a more direct test, we focus on the 
disagreement between hedge funds’ and non-hedge funds’ trading 
with respect to book-to-market effect, and examine whether such 
disagreement predicts the future stock returns. We find evidence 
suggesting that hedge funds can detect overpriced growth securi- 
ties when there is a major difference in opinions with non-hedge 
funds, who aggressively move in the opposite direction.
We believe our findings that hedge funds alter their trading 
in favor of value stocks in the quarter immediately after book-to- 
market values become public information as well as the fact that 
hedge funds have the ability to detect overpriced growth securities 
complement the literature and open the venue for future research 
on the role of disagreements between market participants to better 
understand other stock return anomalies.
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